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ABSTRACT 
 
    In order to provide secure remote access control, a robust and efficient authentication protocol 
should realize mutual authentication and session key agreement between clients and the remote server 
over public channels. Recently, Chun-Ta Li proposed a password authentication and user anonymity 
protocol by using smart cards, and they claimed that their protocol has satisfied all criteria required by 
remote authentication. However, we have found that his protocol cannot provide mutual authentication 
between clients and the remote server. To realize ‘real’ mutual authentication, we propose a two-factor 
remote authentication protocol based on elliptic curve cryptography in this paper, which not only 
satisfies the criteria but also bears low computational cost. Detailed analysis shows our proposed 
protocol is secure and more suitable for practical application. 
 
KEY WORDS: authentication; key agreement; user anonymity; elliptic curve; smart card 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
A secure and efficient remote authentication mechanism is needed to make clients and the remote 
server authenticate each other and generate a session key for future communications. Since the 
password is always chosen by the client freely and easy to remember, it is usually employed to achieve 
the authentication requirement between clients and the remote server over public channels. The first 
password-based remote authentication protocol was proposed by Lamport [1]. This protocol achieved 
  
good performance since only a one-way hash function was used in the protocol. Followed their work, 
many password-based authentication protocols have been proposed to improve the protocol’s security 
and enhance their functionality [2-5]. However, these protocols require the server maintain a password 
table for verification purposes, thereby making them suffer from possible attacks such as insider attacks, 
password disclosure attacks, stolen-verifier attacks and server-spoofing attacks. When large number of 
client registers on the remote server, maintenance and protection of the verification table will become an 
intractable problem. Once the verification table is stolen by the adversary, the security of the system is 
crumbled [6]. Moreover, since the password or verification tables are usually very large, maintaining the 
tables and the reset passwords makes these solutions hard to scale up. Furthermore, passwords might be 
forgotten or divulged. So the password-based authentication protocols cannot provide high security since 
its security solely depends on the sensitive verification tables.  
In order to improve the security, some two-factor authentication protocols have been proposed [7-12]. In 
the two–factor authentication protocols, smart cards are employed to store some secrets and the clients 
only need to remember the passwords. Since the smart cards can show what you have, and the 
passwords can verify what you know, through combining the password and the smart card, two 
different data types, these two-factor authentication protocols can provide strong security authentication. 
However, most of these two-factor protocols cannot resist impersonation attacks, many logged-in 
users’ attacks, password guessing attacks, and so on. The use of smartcards also evokes some new 
security problems such as stolen/lost smartcard attacks, and an evicted client may use an overdue 
smartcard to access the server et al. [13]. Furthermore, the secrets stored in smart cards could be 
extracted by monitoring the power consumption and analyzing the leaked information in the smart cards 
[14-15].  
On the basis of the above description and references [16-17], a robust and efficient remote authentication 
protocol should satisfy the following criteria: (1) The server needs not to maintain any security-sensitive 
password or verification table; (2) Provide security in choosing and updating passwords freely; (3) 
Provide user anonymity to protect the user’s privacy; (4) Provision of mutual authentication and 
session key agreement to protect their future communications; (5) Provision of perfect forward secrecy; 
(6) Prevention of clock synchronization problem and time-delay; (7) Provision of practicability and 
efficiency, that is low computation and communication cost; (8) Resistance to replay, man-in-middle, 
and modification attacks; (9) Resistance to client impersonating and server spoofing attacks; (10) 
  
Resistance to offline dictionary attacks with/without smartcards, password disclosure, stolen-verifier, 
known-key, corrupt insider and many logged-in users’ attacks; (11) Resistance to parallel session and 
stolen/lost smart card attacks. 
     Recently, Chun-Ta Li [17] analyzed the authentication protocol proposed by Islam and Biswas [18], 
proposed an authentication protocol by using password and smartcard based on elliptic curve 
cryptography, and they claimed that their protocol satisfied the criteria mentioned above. However, in 
this paper we prove that Chun-Ta Li’s protocol cannot provide mutual authentication between clients 
and the remote server. We also propose a robust and efficient two-factor authentication protocol with 
key agreement based on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem [19] which satisfies the above 
criteria at the same time. In addition, we use the GNY logic [20] to prove the security of our proposed 
protocol. Compared with the previous schemes [16-18], our protocol not only satisfies more security 
requirements, but also achieves better performance.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 a brief review of Chun-Ta Li’s protocol is 
given. Section 3 describes a cryptanalysis of Chun-Ta Li’s protocol. Our authenticated key agreement 
protocol is presented in Section 4. In Section 5, the security of our proposed protocol is discussed. The 
performance of the protocol is examined in Section 6, and the paper is concluded in Section 7. 
  
 
2. REVIEW OF CHUN-TA LI’S PROTOCOL 
In this section, we briefly review Chun-Ta Li’s password authentication protocol [17]. Their protocol 
consists of four phases: registration, password authentication, password change and session key 
distribution phase, described as follows (as shown in Figure 1): 
 
2.1. Registration phase 
 
When a client A wants to become a new legal client, it performs the following steps with the server S. 
Step R1: : ,A AA S ID U  
The client A chooses its identity AID , its password Apw  and a random integer Ar . Next, it computes a 
password-verifier A A AU pw r G    and keeps Ar  secretly. 
Step R2: :S A SMART CARD 
  
The server S stores each legal client’s identity, password-verifier and a status-bit in a write protected 
file.  Then it stores { , , ( ), ( ), ( )}S K KG U H E D   in a smart card and delivers this smart card to the user A 
in a secure channel. 
Step R3: The user A stores Ar in the smart card. Then the smart card contains 
{ , , , ( ), ( ), ( )}A S K Kr G U H E D   . 
 
2.2. Password authentication phase 
 
When a client A wishes to login to the server S, the client A has to insert its smart card into the card 
reader and type its identity AID  and password Apw . And then the smart card and the server S perform 
the following steps： 
Step A1: ': , ( , , , )
xA K A A A A
A S ID E ID R W U  
The smart card selects a random integer 'Ar , and computes A A S A sR r U r d G  , A A A AW r r PW G , 
' '
A A AU pw r G and '( , , , )xK A A A AE ID R W U , where SU  is the public key of the server S and xK is the x  
coordinate of ( , )A A S A A s x yK pw r U pw r d G K K   . Then it sends AID  and '( , , , )xK A A A AE ID R W U to 
the server S. 
Step A2: ': ( ), ( , )A S S AS A W W H W U   
After receiving the message, the server S computes ( , )s A A A S x yK d U pw r d G K K   to obtain xK , and 
then it decrypts '( , , , )
xK A A A A
E ID R W U by using xK to reveal
'( , , , )A A A AID R W U . Next, the server S 
compares the decrypted AID  with the received AID  and ˆ( , )s A Ae d R U with ˆ( , )A Se W U . If all the 
conditions are satisfied, it chooses a random integer sr  and computes S s S s sW r U r d G  . Then it sends 
( )A SW W and '( , )S AH W U to the client A.  
Step A3: ': , ( , , )A A S AA S ID H W W U  
The client A obtains SW from the received information ( )A SW W and computes '( , )S AH W U . Next it 
verifies whether the computed value '( , )S AH W U  is equal to the received
'( , )S AH W U . If so, the client A 
computes '( , , )A S AH W W U and sends it to the server S. 
 
  
 
 
Fig.1. Chun-Ta Li’s protocol 
 
 
Step A4: :S A Access Granted/Denied 
The server S computes '( , , )A S AH W W U by using its own SW and the received information
'( , )A AW U . 
Then it checks whether the hashed result of '( , , )A S AH W W U is equal to the received
'( , , )A S AH W W U . If 
'{( ), ( , )}A S S AW W H W U  
'{ , ( , , )}A A S AID H W W W  
Verify '( , )S AH W U  
Retrieve SW  from ( )A SW W  
Verify
?
ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , )S A A A Se d R U e W U  
Server S  Client A  
Store { , , ( ), ( ) / ( )}S K KG U H E D    
Select , ,A A AID pw r , compute A A AU pw r G   
{ , }A AID U  
Replace AU with
'
AU  
Registration Phase:  
SMART CARD 
Store Ar into SMART CARD  
Password Authentication Phase:  
Input ', ,A A AID pw r   
Compute ' ', ,A A S A A A A A A AR r U W r r pw G U pw r G     
'{ , ( , , , )}
xA K A A A A
ID E ID R W U  
Decrypt '( , , , )
xK A A A A
E ID R W U   
S S SW r U  
Verify '( , , )A S AH W W W  
Access Granted/Denied 
Replace Ar with
'
Ar  
Password Change Phase:  
Input ' ', , ,A A AID pw pw r   '{ , ( , , , )}
xA K A A A A
ID E ID R W U  
'{( ), ( , )}A S S AW W H W U  
' '{ , ( , , ), ( )}A A S A S A AID H W W W H W W U   
Password Change Granted/Denied 
Session Key Distribution Phase:  
Input ' ', , ,A A AID pw pw r   
'{( ), ( , , )}A S S AW W H W U SK  
'{ , ( , , , )}A A S AID H W W U SK  
Key Distribution Granted/Denied 
( )A A A SSK r r pw W   ( )S S ASK r d W   
'{ , ( , , , )}
xA K A A A A
ID E ID R W U  
  
so, the server S grants A’s login request and replaces A A AU pw r G with ' 'A A AU pw r G , otherwise 
denies A’s login request. Finally, if all the conditions are satisfied, the client A’s smart card will replace 
Ar with
'
Ar .  
After finishing the password authentication phase, the verifier table is updated. 
 
 
2.3. Password authentication phase 
 
When a client A wants to change its password, A must notify the server S to update the old password 
verifier A A AU pw r G with a new password verifier ' ' 'A A AU pw r G .  
Step P1: ': , ( , , , )
xA K A A A A
A S ID E ID R W U  
Step P2: ': ( ), ( , )A S S AS A W W H W U   
Step P3: ' ': , ( , , ), ( )A A S A S A AA S ID H W W U H W W U    
Step P4: :S A Password Change Granted/Denied 
 
2.4. Session key distribution phase 
 
The client A and the server S choose two random numbers , [1, 1]A Sr r n  , respectively. After above 
four phases, the server S replaces AU with 
'
AU  and A’s smart card replaces Ar with
'
Ar . And the client A 
and the server S can compute the session key A A A S SSK r r pw r d G for a new password 
verifier ' ' 'A A AU pw r G .  
Step S1: ': , ( , , , )
xA K A A A A
A S ID E ID R W U  
Step S2: ': ( ), ( , , )A S S AS A W W H W U SK   
Step S3: ': , ( , , , )A A S AA S ID H W W U SK  
Step S4: :S A Key distribution Granted/Denied 
 
 
3. CRYPTANALYSIS OF CHUN-TA LI’S PROTOCOL 
  
In this section, we demonstrate that the protocol proposed by Chun-Ta Li [17] cannot provide mutual 
authentication between the clients and the remote server. 
Proof  
∵ A A S A SR r U r d G  , A A AU pw r G  
∴ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) A A A S Sr r pw d dS A A S A S A Ae d R U e d r d G pw r G e G G   
∵ A A A AW r r pw G S SU d G  
  ∴ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) A A A Sr r pw dA S A A A se W U e r r pw G d G e G G   
∵ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , )A A A S S A A A Sr r pw d d r r pw de G G e G G            
∴ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , )S A A A Se d R U e W U  
So, the verification ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , )S A A A Se d R U e W U provided by Chun-Ta Li [17] is not correct. Even if the 
client is a legal client, she or he cannot pass the verification of the server S. Under this case, the server 
S will not send any message to the legal client and will reject the legal client’s login request. 
Moreover, since the extended protocol with user anonymity provided by Chun-Ta Li is based on the 
protocol described above, the extended protocol also cannot provide mutual authentication. 
According to above analysis, the protocols proposed by Chun-Ta Li cannot provide mutual 
authentication between clients and the server.  
 
4. OUR PROPOSED PROTOCOL 
This section presents our newly designed two-factor (password, smart card) authentication key 
agreement protocol with user anonymity. The proposed protocol consists of five phases: system setup 
phase, registration phase, pre-computation phase, authentication phase and password changing phase. 
The procedures of the proposed protocol are described in detail as follows (as shown in Fig. 2): 
 
4.1. System setup phase 
  
Step S1: The server S chooses an elliptic curve equation 2 3( , ) : (mod )pE a b y x ax b p   over a prime 
finite field pF , where , pa b F and 3 24 27 0(mod )a b p  . Then it selects a base point P over ( , )pE a b .  
  
Step S2: The server S chooses a random integer *R ps Z as a secret key and computes public key 
Ppub=sP, and chooses one secure one-way hash functions *( ) :{0,1} {0,1}kh   . 
Step S3: The server S keeps s  secret and publishes the public information{ ( , ), , ( )}p pubE a b P P h  . 
 
4.2. Registration phase 
 
When the clientU  wants to register with the server S, it performs the following steps with the server S. 
Step R1: : ( , ( ))U S ID h PW r   
The client U selects its password PW and identity ID freely and chooses a random integer *R pr Z . 
Next, the client U computes ( )h PW r  and sends { , ( )}ID h PW r to the server S over a secure 
channel. 
Step R2: After receiving the message from the client U, the server S computes the secret information 
( ( ) )sR E h PW r ID   for the clientU . Then the server S records ID  in an identity table as shown in 
Table 1 which consists of two columns one is for storing the client’s ID and the other Status is used for 
checking whether the login ID is registered, revoked or not. Next it stores R in the memory of a smart 
card and delivers the smart card to the client U in a secure manner.  
Step R3: Upon receiving the smart card, the client U stores the secret random integer r in the smart card. 
Then the memory of the smart card contains ( , )R r . The client U keeps the password ,PW ID and the 
smart card secretly for the registration process. 
Table 1. Identity table 
Identity Status 
ID1 0/1 
ID2 0/1 
…… …… 
IDi 0/1 
…… …… 
 
4.3. Authentication phase 
 
  
In the authentication phase, the smart card and the server S perform the following four steps. 
Step A1: : ( , )U S W Z   
The client U first inputs its password PW and its identity ID . It then selects a random integer *1 R pr Z , 
and computes 1( )V h PW ID r r P   , 1( ) pubW h PW ID r r P    and _ ( ( ) )co xVZ E R h PW r ID  , 
where
_co xV
E is an encryption function with the x-coordinate of elliptic curve pointV . Finally, it sends 
( , )W Z  to the server S. 
Step A2: 3: ( , )S U X r  
After receiving the message, the server S computes * 1 1 1( )V s W s h PW ID r r sP
      
1( )h PW ID r r P   by using the server’s secret key s. It then obtains the x-coordinate of elliptic 
curve point *V denoted as * _co xV and decrypts Z by using it to get information , ( )R h PW r and ID . 
Next, the server S checks whether ID is valid according to the identity table. If not, terminate the 
authentication session. Otherwise, it decrypts R by using its secret key s to obtain ( )h PW r and ID. 
Then the server S compares the value of the ID in Z with that of the ID in R to make sure that the 
message was indeed sent by the client U. Next it checks whether the value ( )h PW r  in Z is equal to 
the value ( )h PW r getting from R. If so, it generates two random integers *2 3, R pr r Z , and computes 
the session key * _ 2( )co xSK h V r and authentication message * _ 3( )s co xAuth h V r . Then the server S 
encrypts the secret random integer 2r and authentication message sAuth by using ( ( ) )h h PW r ID  . 
At last it sends the encrypted message ( ( ) ) 2( )h h PW r ID sX E Auth r   and random integer 3r to the 
clientU .  
Step A3: : ( )uU S Auth  
Upon receiving the message, the client U inputs its password PW and identity ID to compute the 
decryption key ( ( ) )h h PW r ID  . And then it can decrypt the message X to obtain the authentication 
message sAuth and the integer 2r . After that the client can compute the session 
key ' 1 _ 2(( ( ) ) )co xSK h h PW ID r r P r   . Then the client U checks whether the equation 
?
_ 3( )s co xAuth h V r  holds. If the equation holds, it computes ' 3( ( 1))uAuth h SK r  and sends uAuth to 
the server S. Otherwise, it deletes the received information and the protocol stops. 
  
Step A4: After receiving the response message, the server S verifies whether the following equation 
holds
?
3( ( 1))uAuth h SK r  . If the message is authenticated, the server S sets SK as the shared session 
key with the clientU ; otherwise, it deletes the received information and the protocol stops.  
 
 
Fig.2. The proposed protocol 
 
4.4. Password changing phase 
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      
Decrypt R by using s 
Password Change Phase:  
Select * * *, , R qPW N r Z   
* * * *{ , ( ( ) ( ( ) ))}SKN E h PW r ID N h h PW r ID N   
* *( ( 1 ))SKE R h N R  
_
( ( ) )
co xV
Z E R h PW r ID    
Decrypt Z by using * _co xV   
Compare two IDs and two values of ( )h PW r  
Select *2 3, R qr r Z  
Compute * _ 2( )co xSK h V r   
*
_ 3( )s co xAuth h V r   
( ( ) ) 2( )h h PW r ID sX E Auth r    
Compute ' 1 _ 2(( ( ) ) )co xSK h h PW ID r r P r     
?
_ 3( )s co xAuth h V r   
?
3( ( 1))uAuth h SK r    
Compute * * * *( ( ) ( ( ) ))SKE h PW r ID N h h PW r ID N    
Verify the tag * *( ( ) )h h PW r ID N   
Compute * * *( ( ) )sR E h PW r ID    
* *( ( 1 ))SKE R h N R   
Verify the tag *( 1 )h N R   
Store * *( , )R r into SMART CARD  
  
If the client U wants to change its password PW to a new password *PW , it needs to agree on a session 
key with the server S via the authentication phase in advance. And the client U must notify the server S 
to update the old secret ( ( ) )sR E h PW r ID  with a new secret * * *( ( ) )sR E h PW r ID  . All steps 
of the password changing phase are executed as follows:  
 
Step P1: The client U  selects a new random integer * *R qr Z , a new password *PW and a nonce N  for 
freshness checking. Then it encrypts the new password message * *( )h PW r ID  by using the session 
key SK . Next, it sends * * * *( ( ) ( ( ) ))SKE h PW r ID N h h PW r ID N 
 
and N to the server S. 
Step P2: After receiving the message, the server S uses the session key SK to decrypt the encryption 
message and verifies whether the authentication tag * *( ( ) )h h PW r ID N is valid. If true, it computes 
a new secret value * * *( ( ) )sR E h PW r ID  and sends * *( ( 1 ))SKE R h N R  to the client U . 
Otherwise, it rejects the password changing requirement.  
  Step P3: Upon receiving the message, the client U decrypts the message and verifies whether the 
authentication tag *( 1 )h N R is valid. If so, the client U stores * *( , )R r  in its smart card. Otherwise, it 
stops the password updating. 
 
 
5. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
 
5.1 Authentication proof based on Gong-Needham-Yahalom logic 
In this section, first we introduce some formulae and statements that will be used in the Gong-
Needham-Yahalom (GNY) logic; and then set the goals and list the assumptions of the protocol; finally 
we use the GNY logic to prove our proposed protocol. GNY logic has been widely used to formally 
analyze the completeness of authentication protocols. It has successfully found defects in several 
protocols and disclosed redundancies in many protocols. So in this paper, we adopt the GNY logic to 
evaluate the security of the proposed protocol. 
 
5.1.1 Formulae and statements 
  
A formula is a name used to refer to a bit string, which has a particular value in a run [20]. Let X and Y 
range over formulae. First we introduce some formulae used in our authentication proof and the 
complete list of all logical postulates is shown in [20]. 
(1) (X, Y): conjunction of two formulae X and Y.  
(2) {X}K and 1{ }KX
 : symmetrically encrypt and decrypt X with the key K.  
(4) h(X): a one-way function of X.  
(5) *X: X is not originated here. 
A basic statement reflects some property of a formula [20]. Let P and Q range over principals. Then we 
introduce some statements as follows: 
(1) P X< : P is told formula X.  
(2) P X : P possesses formula X.  
(2) ~P X : P once conveyed formula X.  
(3) #( )P X : P believes that X is fresh. 
(4) ( )P X : P believes that X is recognizable.  
(5) SP Q : P believes that S is a suitable secret for P and Q.
  
 
5.1.2 Protocol description 
We first change some notations to fit the GNY logic and transform our protocol into the form of P→
Q:(X). In the following transformation, the notation x_V is regarded as co xV  in our protocol.  
(1) 
_ ( ) 11
: ( ( ) ,{ ( ) } )
x h PW ID r r P
U S h PW ID r r sP R h PW r ID       
(2) 1 3 2 ( ( ) ) 3: ({ ( _ ( ) ) } , )h h PW r IDS U h x h PW ID r r P r r r     
(3) 1 2 3: ( ( ( _ ( ) ) ( 1)))U S h h x h PW ID r r P r r     
 
5.1.3 Goals 
We descript our goals as follows: 
(1) Message content authentication 
Goal 1: S believes that the message in the first run is recognizable.  
_ ( ) 11
{ ( ) ,{ ( ) } }
x h PW ID r r P
S h PW ID r r sP R h PW r ID        
  
Goal 2: U believes that the message in the second run is recognizable.  
1 3 2 ( ( ) ) 3{{ ( _ ( ) ) } , }h h PW r IDU h x h PW ID r r P r r r      
Goal 3: S believes that the message in the third run is recognizable.  
      1 2 3{ ( ( _ ( ) ) ( 1))}S h h x h PW ID r r P r r              
(2) Message origin authentication 
Goal 4: U believes S conveyed the message in the second run. 
1 3 2 ( ( ) )~{{ ( _ ( ) ) } }h h PW r IDU S h x h PW ID r r P r r      
Goal 5: S believes U conveyed the message in the third run. 
1 2 3~{ ( ( _ ( ) ) ( 1))}S U h h x h PW ID r r P r r     
(3) Session key material establishment 
Goal 6: U believes that S believes that r2 is a secret shared between U and S. 
SKU S U S    
Goal 7: U believes that r2 is a secret shared between U and S. 
SKU U S   
Goal 8: S believes that U possesses SK. 
S U SK   
Goal 9: S believes that U believes that SK  is a secret shared between U and S. 
SKS U U S    
 
5.1.4 Assumption list 
To derive our goals, some assumptions are made as follows: 
(1) S possesses the secret key s. 
S s  
(2) Since S keeps the identity table, S believes that ID is recognizable. 
( )S ID  
(3) The random integer r1 and r are generated by U in the protocol, so U possesses r1 and r. The 
password PW and ID are chosen by U in the protocol and are keep secret, therefore U possesses PW 
and ID and believes that ID is fresh. Moreover, the point P is public, and then U possesses P. 
  
1, , , , , #( )U r U r U PW U P U ID U ID        
(4) We assume that U believes ( ( ) )h h PW r ID  is a suitable secret for himself and S. 
( ( ) )h h PW r IDU U S    
(5) The SK generated by S is a temporal session key in the current run. So we assume that S 
believes that SK is a suitable secret between U and S. 
2rS U S   
(6) The random integer r2 and r3 are generated by S in the protocol, so S possesses r2, r3 and 
believes that r2 and r3 are fresh. 
2 2, #( )S r S r  , 3 3, #( )S r S r   
(7) U believes that the server S is an authority on generating a suitable session key material SK 
shared between U and S. 
SKU S U S    
 
5.1.5 Authentication proof by using Gong-Needham-Yahalom (GNY) logic 
In this subsection, we use the GNY logic to analyze the proposed protocol. A complete list of all 
logical postulates and the index in the list is provided [20], such as (T1, P1), to show how to achieve 
the goals defined in subsection 5.1.3.  
(1) The first run:                                                                                                                                 
1
1
( ) ,
_ ( )
S h PW ID r r sP S s
S x h PW ID r r P
  
  
<
(P1, P2, P3)                                                                           (1) 
If S is told a formula 1( )h PW ID r r sP  and possesses a key s (Assumption 1), then it is consider to 
possess the formula 1( )h PW ID r r P  , as well as possess x-V.                                                                                                  
( ),
{ ( ) , }s
S ID S s
S h PW r ID


 
    (R1, R2)                                                                                          (2)                                                    
If S believes that ID is recognizable (Assumption 2) and possesses the secret key s (Assumption 1), 
then S believes that the encrypted message { ( ), }sh PW r ID with ID as a component in it, is 
recognizable. So, S can recognize the secret ( ( ) )sR E h PW r ID  in the smart card of the client U.  
  
_
( ), _
{ , ( ), }x V
S R S x V
S R h PW r ID


 
    (R1, R2)                                                                                      (3) 
If S believes that R is recognizable (A2) and possesses the key x_V (A1), then S believes that the 
encrypted _{ , ( ), }x VR h PW r ID with R as a component in it, is recognizable. So, S can 
recognize _{ , ( ), }x VR h PW r ID .  
_
1 _
({ , ( ), } )
( ( ) ,{ , ( ), } )
x V
x V
S R h PW r ID
S h PW ID r r sP R h PW r ID


 
      (R1)                                                        (4) 
If S believes _{ , ( ), }x VR h PW r ID is recognizable (A3), then it believes that 
1 _( ( ) ,{ , ( ), } )x Vh PW ID r r sP R h PW r ID   of which _{ , ( ), }x VR h PW r ID is a component, is 
recognizable. 
 
According to A4, in the proposed protocol, the server S can recognize the message 
_ ( ) 11
{ ( ) ,{ ( ) } }
x h PW ID r r P
h PW ID r r sP R h PW r ID     in the first run.                                           (Goal 1) 
 
(2) The second run:
  
, ,
( ), ( ) , ( ( ) )
U PW U ID U r
U h PW ID r U h PW r ID U h h PW r ID
  
           (P2, P4)                     (5)                                                    
If U possesses PW, ID and r (Assumption 3), it is capable of possessing ( )h PW ID r  , 
( )h PW r ID  and ( ( ) )h h PW r ID  . 
1( ), ,
_
U h PW ID r U r U P
U x V
    
   (P2, P3)                                                                        (6) 
If U possesses ( )h PW ID r  (A5), P and r1 (Assumption 3), it is capable of possessing x_V. 
3
_
( _ , )
U x V
U x V r

   (P4, R6, R1)                                                                                                 (7) 
If U possesses x_V (A6), then U is entitled to believe that (x_V, r3) is recognizable. 
3 3( _ , ), _ ,
( )
U x V r U x V U r
U Auths


 

<
  (P1, P2, R5)                                                                     (8) 
If U believes that (x_V, r3) is recognizable (A7) and U possesses (x_V, r3) (P2, since U is told r3 and 
possesses x_V (A6), then it possesses (x_V, r3)), then U is entitled to believe that 3( )co xAuths h V r  is 
recognizable. 
  
2 ( ( ) ) 2 ( ( ) ) 3
( ), ( ( ) )
({ , } ), ({ , } , )h h PW r ID h h PW r ID
U Auths U h h PW r ID
U Auths r U Auths r r

    
   
    (R1, R2)                            (9) 
If U believes that the formula Auths (8) is recognizable and U possesses the key 
( ( ) )h h PW r ID  (5), 
then U is entitled to believe that 2 ( ( ) ){ , }h h PW r IDAuths r   , of which Auths is a component, is recognizable. 
And U also believe that ( 2 ( ( ) ){ , }h h PW r IDAuths r   , r3) of which 2 ( ( ) ){ , }h h PW r IDAuths r    is a component is 
recognizable. 
So, according to (9) we can say that in the proposed protocol, U can recognize the message 
1 3 2 ( ( ) ) 3{{ ( _ ( ) ) } , }h h PW r IDh x h PW ID r r P r r r    in the second run. (Goal 2) 
#( ), ( )
# ( ( ) )
U ID P h PW r ID
U h h PW r ID
   
     (F1, F10)                                                                          (10)   
If U believes that ID (Assumption 3) is fresh then it believes that ( )h PW r ID  is fresh. Since U 
also possesses ( )h PW r ID   (A5), then it is entitled to believe that ( ( ) )h h PW r ID  is fresh.
  
2 ( ( ) )
( ), ( ( ) ), # ( ( ) )
#{ , }h h PW r ID
U Auths U h h PW r ID U h h PW r ID
U Auths r

 
      
   (F1, F7)                       (11) 
If U believes that the formula Auths is recognizable (8) and U possesses the key ( ( ) )h h PW r ID   
(A5) and believes that ( ( ) )h h PW r ID   is fresh (10), and then U is entitled to believe that the 
encrypted formula 2 ( ( ) ){ , }h h PW r IDAuths r   , of which Auths is a component, is fresh. Therefore, U can 
identify that the message in the second run of the proposed protocol is fresh. 
2 ( ( ) )
( ( ) )
2
2 ( ( ) )
*{ , } , ( ( ) ),
, ( , ), # ( ( ) )
~{ , } , ( ( ) )
h h PW r ID
h h PW r ID
h h PW r ID
U Auths r U h h PW r ID
U U S U Auths r U h h PW r ID
U S Auths r U S h h PW r ID

 
 
 
  
     
    
<
  (I1)                            (12) 
If all of the following conditions hold: 1) U receives the formula (Auths, r2) encrypted with the key 
( ( ) )h h PW r ID   and marked with a not-originated-here mark; 2) U possesses 
( ( ) )h h PW r ID  (5); 3) U believes that ( ( ) )h h PW r ID  is a suitable secret for himself and S 
(Assumption 4); 4) U believes that the formula (Auths, r2) is recognizable (9); and 5) U believes that 
( ( ) )h h PW r ID   is fresh (10). 
Then U is entitled to believe that 1) S once conveyed (Auths, r2) encrypted with ( ( ) )h h PW r ID   
and 2) U believes that the server S possesses ( ( ) )h h PW r ID   (Goal 4) 
  
According to the GNY logic, we assume that *U S S   , that is, U believes that S is honest and 
competent, and then we can deduce the following statement: 
2 ( ( ) ) 2 ( ( ) )*, ~ ({ , } ~ ), #{ , }
SK
h h PW r ID h h PW r ID
SK
U S S U S Auths r S U S U Auths r
U S U S
          
   (J2)   
(13)
 
If U believes that S is honest and competent; and U receives a message 
2 ( ( ) )({ , } ~ )
SK
h h PW r IDAuths r S U S     (Assumption 5), which it believes S conveyed (12), then U 
ought to believe that S really believes SKU S .  
According to (13), U believes that S believes that SK is a suitable secret between U and S.  (Goal 6)                                            
,SK SK
SK
U S U S U S U S
U U S
     
    (J1)                                                                         (14) 
If U believes that S is an authority on the statement SKU S (Assumption 7) and S believe 
in SKU S (13), then U ought to believe in SKU S as well.  
According to (14), U believes that SK is a suitable secret between U and S. (Goal 7) 
 
(3) The third flow: 
2
2( _ , )
S r
S x V r

  (Assumption 6, P4, R6, R1)               (15) 
If S possesses r2 (Assumption 6) then it believes that r2 is recognizable, and (x_V, r2) is recognizable. 
2 2
2
( _ , ), ( _ , )
( ( _ , ))
S x V r S x V r
S h x V r


 
 (A15, A1, Assumption 6, P2, R5)                                      (16) 
If S believes that (x_V, r2) is recognizable (15) and it also possesses (x_V, r2), then S believes that 
h(x_V, r2) is recognizable. 
  2 2 3
2 3
( ( _ , )), ( _ , ),
( ( _ , ), ( 1))
S h x V r S x V r S r
S h h x V r r


  
   (A16, R1, A1, Assumption 6, P2, P4, R5)               (17) 
If S believes that h(x_V, r2) is recognizable (16) , then it is entitled to believe that (h(x_V, r2),( r3+1)) is 
recognizable (R1). And if S possesses (x_V, r2) (1, Assumption 6, P2) and r3 (Assumption 6), then it is 
capable of possessing (h(x_V, r2),( r3+1)) (P4, P2) . So, according to R5, S is entitled to believe that 
h(h(x_V, r2),( r3+1)) is recognizable. 
  
According to (17), we can say that S believes that the message 
1 2 3{ ( ( _ ( ) ) ( 1))}h h x h PW ID r r P r r   in the third run is recognizable.                                   (Goal 3)    
2_ ,S x V S r
S SK
 
 (A1, Assumption 6, P2, P4)                                         (18) 
If S possesses x_V (A1) and r2 (Assumption 2), it is capable of possessing (x_V, r2), and so it is
 capable 
of possessing 2( _ )SK h x V r . 
    
3
3
,
(( 1), )
S SK S r
S r SK
 
  (A18, Assumption 6, P2)                                                             (19) 
If S possesses SK (A18) and r3 (Assumption 6), then it is capable of possessing ((r3+1), SK). 
2#( )
#( )
S r
S SK

 (Assumption 6, F1)                                                                                                 (20) 
If S believes r2 is fresh (Assumption 6) then it is entitled to believe that SK is fresh.
 
3 3
3 3
* (( 1), ), (( 1), ), , #( )
~ (( 1), ) , ~ (( 1), )
SKS h r SK S r SK S S U S SK
S U r SK S U h r SK
       
       
<
(I3)                                  (21)
 
If all of the following conditions hold: 1) S receives a formula 3( ( 1))uAuth h SK r   consisting of a 
one way function of (r3+1) and SK marked with a not-originated-here mark; 2) S possesses (r3+1) and 
SK (19); 3) S believes SK is a suitable secret for himself and U (Assumption 5); 4) U believes that SK is 
fresh (20). Then S is entitled to believe that U once conveyed ((r3+1), SK) and h((r3+1), SK). 
According to (21), we can say that S believes that the message Authu in the third run of the proposed 
protocol is conveyed from the U.                                                                                                    (Goal 5) 
3~ (( 1), ) , #( )S U r SK S SK
S U SK
  
  (I6, I7, P3)                                                                          (22) 
If S believes that U once conveyed the formula ((r3+1), SK) (21), then it is entitled to believe that U 
once conveyed SK (I7). Since S believes that SK is fresh (20) and U once conveyed SK, then S is 
entitled to believe that U possesses SK.  
According to (22), S believes that SK is possessed by U.                                                           (Goal 8)   
According to the GNY logic, we assume that *U S S   , that is, S believes that U is honest and 
competent, and then we can deduce the following statement: 
*, ~ ( ~ ), #( )SKu u
SK
S U U S U Auth U U S S Auth
S U U S
       
   (J2)                                 (23) 
  
If S believes that U is honest and competent, and S receives a message ~ SKuAuth U U S    which 
it believes U conveyed (21), then S ought to believe that U really believes SKU S .    
According to (23), we can say that in the proposed protocol, S believes that SK is a suitable secret 
between U and S.                                                                                                                             (Goal 9)
 
 
5.2 Discussion on possible attacks 
5.2.1 Replay attacks 
Supposing that an adversary Bob intercepts the client U’s previous message (W, Z) in Step A1 and 
replays it to the server S to impersonate the client U. However, in Step A3，Bob cannot construct a 
valid Authu to pass the verification process of the server S unless he can correctly guess the session 
key 2( )co xSK h V r . In order to construct a valid Authu, Bob needs to extract V from the intercepted 
message W, which is equivalent to solving an elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem without the 
knowledge of the server’s secret key s. Moreover, Bob cannot obtain V by decrypting the intercepted 
message Z since it is protected by a secure symmetric encryption algorithm. Furthermore, Bob cannot 
correctly guess the random integer r2 from the intercepted message X without the knowledge of the 
client’s password PW, the client’s identifier ID and a secret random integer r. So, Bob cannot generate 
a valid Authu to pass the verification process of the server S in Step A4. Therefore, the proposed 
protocol can resist the replay attacks. 
 
5.2.2 Man-in-the-middle attacks 
In the proposed protocol, a session key SK can be shared only after mutual authentication between the 
client U and the server S. So, if an adversary Bob attempts to make the server S believe that it is talking 
to the client U, he need to pass the verification process of the server S. But Bob cannot pass the 
verification without the knowledge of the client U’s password, client’s identifier ID and the secret 
random integer r. On the other hand, for the same reason, Bob cannot construct a valid Auths to pass the 
verification process of the client U. So, Bob cannot cheat the client U to share a session key and make 
the client U believe that the key is shared with the server S. Therefore, Bob cannot launch the man-in-
middle attack to cheat either the client U or the server S.  
 
5.2.3 Impersonation attacks 
  
Assuming an adversary Bob sends a fraud message (W’, Z’) to the server S to impersonate the client. 
But, Bob cannot construct a valid R without the knowledge of the server’s secret key s. Therefore, the 
server S can easily find this attack by comparing the value of the ID in Z with that of the ID in R. 
Moreover, the server S can also detect this attack by checking whether the value ( )h PW r  in Z is 
equal to the value ( )h PW r getting from R.  
Supposing an adversary Bob modifies the message (X’, r3’) and sends it to the client U to impersonate 
the server S. But Bob cannot correctly guess the decryption key ( ( ) )h h PW r ID  and construct a 
valid authentication message Auths to pass the verification process of the client U. Therefore the client 
U can easily detect the attack by checking whether the equation 
?
3( )s co xAuth h V r is hold. 
If an adversary Bob forges an authentication message Authu’ and sends it to the server S to impersonate 
the client U. The server S can find out that Authu’ is not equivalent to its computed value, since Bob 
cannot correctly guess the value of SK without the knowledge of the client U’s password PW, identity 
ID and the secret random integer (r, r1) or the server’s secret key s. Therefore, the proposed protocol 
can resist the modification attacks. 
 
5.2.4 Stolen-verifier attacks 
 
In the proposed protocol, no password or verification tables are stored on the server S. Therefore, the 
protocol can resist the stolen-verifier attacks.  
 
5.2.5 Offline dictionary attacks without the smart card 
Suppose an adversary intercepts all messages relay between the client U and the server S through 
eavesdropping communications and then carrying out the offline dictionary attack. In order to obtain 
the client U’s password PW , Bob needs to extract ( )h PW ID r  from 1( )W h PW ID r r sP   , 
which is equivalent to solving an instance of elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. Even if Bob can 
obtain the value ( )h PW ID r  , he cannot correctly guess the client U’s password, since the entropy 
of the secret random integer r is very large. So Bob cannot launch the offline dictionary attack by using 
the intercepted message W. Furthermore, since the client U’s password PW is protected by a secure 
symmetric encryption algorithm and a high entropy random integer r, so Bob cannot derive it from the 
  
information Z, X or Authu. Therefore, the proposed protocol can withstand against the offline dictionary 
attack without the smart card.  
 
5.2.6 Offline dictionary attacks with the smart card 
Assuming an adversary Bob compromises the secret information (R, r) stored in the smart card of the 
client U and intercepts all the messages transmitted between the client U and the server U. Compared 
with the offline dictionary attack without the smart card, the addition information known by Bob in this 
attack is (R, r). However, without the knowledge of the server’s secret key s, Bob cannot obtain 
( )h PW r  from R and know whether each of their guessed passwords is correct or not. Therefore, the 
proposed protocol can resist the offline dictionary attack with the smart card.  
 
5.2.7 Insider Attacks 
In the proposed protocol, the server S needs not to store a password or verification table, so a 
privileged-insider of the server S cannot access other servers by stealing the identity and password-
verifier from the server S’s verification table. Therefore, the proposed protocol can resist the insider 
attacks. 
 
5.2.8 Many logged-in users’ attacks 
Assuming that the client U’s password PW and the identity ID are leaked to more than one adversary. 
At this case, when adversaries try to login the server S using the client U’s password and identity at the 
same time, the server S will find the attacks by checking the client U’s login status Status stored in the 
identity table. Therefore, the adversaries cannot launch many logged-in users’ attacks successfully.   
 
5.2.9 Password disclosure attacks 
In our protocol, in the register phase, the client U sends ( )h PW r instead of its password to the server 
S, since the password is protected by a high entropy random integer r chosen by the client U and keep 
secret, so the server S cannot find an opportunity to obtain the client’s password in the register phase. 
Therefore, the proposed protocol can resist the password disclosure attacks. 
 
5.2.10 Provide session key security 
  
In the proposed protocol, only the client U and the server S can compute the session key 
1 1 _ 2(( ( ) ) )co xSK h h PW ID r r P r   at the end of the key exchange. If the adversary Bob attempts to 
obtain the session key SK, he needs to extract 1( )h PW ID r r P  from the intercepted message W, 
which is equivalent to solving an instance of elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. Furthermore, 
Bob cannot correctly guess the random integer r2 without the knowledge of the client’s password PW, 
the client’s identifier ID and a secret random integer r or the server’s secret key s. So, the session key 
SK is not known by anyone but only the client U and the server S. Therefore, the proposed protocol 
provides session key security.  
 
5.2.11 Provide known-key security 
In the proposed protocol, the session key SK of each session is not connected with the session keys of 
any other sessions, since the random numbers r1and r2 generated independently by the client U and the 
server S are different in each session process. Even if the adversary Bob compromises a session key SK, 
he cannot compute other session keys ' '1 1 _ 2(( ( ) ) )co xSK h h PW ID r r P r   . This is because the high 
entropy random integers '1r and 
'
2r  are differ in every session. Therefore, the proposed protocol provides 
the known-key security.  
 
5.2.12 Provide perfect forward secrecy 
In the proposed protocol, the long-term private key of the client U is its password PW. Supposing that 
the adversary Bob compromises the client’s password PW and intercepts all messages relays between 
the client U and the server S. But knowing above information is not enough for computing a previous 
session key SK, because Bob cannot correctly guess the valid random integer r2 and compute a 
correct 1( )h PW ID r r P  . When Bob tries to extract the value 1( )h PW ID r r P  from the message 
W, he will face an elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. Furthermore, Bob cannot correctly guess 
the random integer r2 without the knowledge of the client’s identifier ID and the high entropy random 
integer r. Therefore, in the proposed protocol, even if the client’s password PW is compromised, the 
secrecy of previous session keys established by them cannot be affected.  
 
5.2.13 Provide mutual authentication 
  
In the proposed protocol, the server S and the client U authenticate each other by checking Authu and 
Auths, respectively. Therefore, the proposed protocol can provide mutual authentication.  
 
5.2.14 Provide security in choosing and updating passwords 
In order to helps users to remember their own passwords, the legitimate clients with the smartcards can 
freely choose their favorite passwords in the proposed protocol. Furthermore, an update password 
phase for users to change their password is also provided in the proposed protocol. Even if the smart 
card has lost or has been stolen, any other person cannot change or update the password, since they do 
not know the current session key SK shared between the client U and the server S.    
  
5.2.15 Provide user anonymity 
In the proposed protocol, the anonymity of the client U is obtained by hash function, symmetric 
encryption technique and elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. In the proposed protocol, the 
client’s identifier ID is protected by a secure symmetric encryption algorithm, elliptic curve discrete 
logarithm problem. So, even if an adversary Bob compromises the secret ( , )R r stored in the smartcard 
and record the used messages transmitted between the client U and the server S, he cannot derive the 
real identifier ID of the client without the knowledge of secret key s. 
 
 
6. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS 
 
In this section, we first evaluate the security and summarize the functionality of our protocol, and then 
compare the computational cost of our protocol with other related protocols.  
As shown in Table 2, compared with [17] and [18], our proposed protocol can provide more unique 
features such as user anonymity and no password or verifier table. These new features are very 
important in implementing a practical and universal authenticated key agreement. Moreover, Table 2 
also shows that the proposed protocol is more robust and secure than other related protocols. In the 
proposed protocol, since the server does not need to store any password table, the adversary cannot 
launch the stolen-password attack and the server spoofing attack successfully. The proposed protocol 
can also resist the attacks associated with client’s identity, because the client’s real identity ID is 
  
protected by hash function, symmetric encryption technique and elliptic curve discrete logarithm 
problem, so the adversary cannot guess the client’s real identity correctly. In addition, the proposed 
protocol is secure against other attacks mentioned in Section 5, such as the password disclosure attack, 
the insider attack, the impersonation attack, the many logged-in users’ attack, the stolen smartcard 
attack, et al. 
Table 2. Security and functionality comparisons between our protocol and other protocols  
 
Next, we discuss the computational costs of the proposed protocol in each phase. In the registration 
phase, one hash operations is required to compute ( )h PW r on the client side, and one symmetric 
key encryption operation is needed to obtain R on the server side. In the authentication phase, the client 
takes two scalar multiplication operations of elliptic curve to compute 
1( )V h PW ID r r P   and 1( ) pubW h PW ID r r P   ; one symmetric key encryption operations to 
compute Z; one symmetric key decryption operation to decrypt X; and five one-way hash function 
operations to compute ( ( ) ),h h PW r ID   ( )h PW ID r  , SK, Authu and Auths. The server takes 
one scalar multiplication operation of elliptic curve and one modular inversion operation to get V*; one 
symmetric key encryption operations to compute X; two symmetric key decryption operation to decrypt 
Z and R; and four one-way hash function operations to compute ( ( ) ),h h PW r ID   SK, Authu and 
Auths. In the password changing phase, the client takes three one-way hash function operations to 
compute * * * *( ), ( ( ) )h PW r h h PW r ID N 
 
and *( 1 )h N R ; one symmetric key encryption 
operation and one symmetric key decryption operation. The server takes two one-way hash function 
Chun-Ta [17] 
No password or verifier table 
Freely choosing and updating the password 
× 
Session key agreement  
Secure to server spoofing attacks  
Secure to password guessing attacks  
 
N/A
× 
N/A 
User anonymity × 
Wamg-Juang-Lei [16] 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
× 
√ √ 
Our protocol 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
Islam-Biswas [18] 
× 
√ 
× 
√ 
√ 
× 
Secure mutual authentication √ √ × √ 
√ √ 
√ Secure to stolen-verifier attacks  × N/A √ 
Secure to password disclosure attacks N/A√ √ × 
Secure to insider attacks  N/A√ √ × 
√ Secure to impersonation attacks  × N/A √ 
Secure to many logged-in user’s attacks  × √ N/A √ 
Secure to stolen smart card  √ N/A N/A √ 
  
operations to compute * *( ( ) )h h PW r ID N  and *( 1 )h N R ; and one symmetric key decryption 
operation and two symmetric key encryption operation. 
For the convenience of evaluating the computational cost, some notations are defined as follows: 
(1) Tb : is the time for executing a bilinear map operation; 
(2) Tm : is the time for executing a scalar multiplication operation of elliptic curve; 
(3) Ta : is the time for executing a point addition operation of elliptic curve; 
(4) Th  : is the time for executing a one-way hash function; 
(5) Tinv : is the time for executing a modular inversion operation; 
(6) Te : is the time for executing a symmetric key encryption operation; 
(7) Td : is the time for executing a symmetric key decryption operation.  
Experimental results [21–23] show that the time for executing a symmetric key encryption/decryption 
operation Te/Td, a bilinear pairing operation Tb, and a scalar multiplication operation of elliptic curve 
Tm are 0.0087, 0.38 and 0.13 s respectively. And the time for performing a point addition operation of 
elliptic curve Ta, a modular inversion operation Tv, and a hash function operation Th are less than 0.1, 
0.03, and 0.001 s respectively. According to Table 3, the total required computational time of Islam-
Biswas’s protocol, Chun-Ta’s protocol, and our protocol are 1.3624, 1.5224 and 0.3038 s at the client 
side respectively, and 2.4924, 2.3924 and 0.2269 s at the server side respectively. Close analysis of the 
data in Table 3, shows that our proposed protocol is more efficient than Islam-Biswas’s protocol [18] 
and Chun-Ta’s protocol [17], because it eliminates the expansive operation bilinear pairing operations 
and reduces the numbers of the operations of scalar multiplication of elliptic curve. 
Table 3. Computational comparisons between our protocol and others 
 Computational 
cost 
Islam-Biswas [18] Chun-Ta [17] Our protocol 
Registration phase  Client 1Tm ≈ 0.13 s 1Tm ≈ 0.13 s 1Th ≈ 0.001 s 
 Server   1Te  ≈ 0.0087 s 
Authentication 
phase (password 
authentication & 
Session key 
distribution ) 
 Client 4Tm+1Ta +1Te+2Th ≈ 
0.6307 s 
5Tm+1Ta +1Te+2Th  ≈ 
0.7607 s 
2Tm+1Te+1Td+5Th  ≈ 
0.2824 s 
 Server 2Tb+3Tm+1Ta +1Td+2Th  ≈ 
1.2607 s 
2Tb+3Tm+1Ta +1Td+2Th 
≈ 1.2607 s 
1Tm+1Tinv +1Te+2Td+4Th 
≈ 0.1901 s 
  
Password 
changing phase 
 Client 3Tm+2Ta +1Te+3Th ≈ 
0.6017 s 
4Tm+1Ta +1Te+3Th  ≈ 
0.6317 s 
1Te+1Td+3Th  ≈ 
0.0204 s 
 Server 2Tb+2Tm+2Ta +1Td+3Th ≈ 
1.2317 s 
2Tb+2Tm+1Ta +1Td+3Th 
≈ 1.1317 s 
2Te+1Td+2Th  ≈ 
0.0281 s 
Overall  Client 8Tm+3Ta +2Te+5Th  ≈ 
1.3624 s 
10Tm+2Ta +2Te+5Th ≈ 
1.5224 s 
2Tm+2Te+2Td+9Th ≈ 
0.3038 s 
 Server 4Tb+5Tm+3Ta +2Td+5Th  ≈ 
2.4924 s 
4Tb+5Tm+2Ta +2Td+5Th 
≈2.3924 s 
1Tm+1Tinv +4Te+3Td+6Th 
≈ 0.2269 s 
 
From above discussion, we can conclude that our proposed protocol not only satisfies all the criteria 
required by mutual authentication and key agreement protocol, but also reduces the computational cost 
to an extent. 
 
7. CONCULSION 
 
In this paper, we have found that Chun-Ta Li’s protocol cannot provide mutual authentication between 
the client and the server, and then we have proposed a robust and efficient authentication protocol 
based on elliptic curve cryptography by using the password and the smart card. The proposed protocol 
satisfies all the criteria aforementioned which are very important for mutual authentication and key 
agreement by using the password and the smart card. The security analysis has proved the proposed 
protocol can resist all possible attacks, and the performance analysis has shown that our protocol 
achieves better performance that other related protocols. So the proposed protocol is more suitable for 
practical application. 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
 
This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Numbers 
61303237, 61272469, 61075063), the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (Grant 
Number 2013199037), Wuhan Scientific Research Program (Grant Number 2013010501010144) and 
China Postdoctoral Fund (Grant Number 2012194091). 
  
 
REFERENCES 
 
 
1. Lamport, L. (1981). Password authenticationwith insecure communication. Communications of the ACM, 
24(11), 770–772. 
2. Peyravian,M.,&Zunic, N. (2006).Methods for protecting password transmission. Computers&Security, 19(2006), 
466–469. 
3. Peyravian, M., & Jeffries, C. (2006). Secure remote user access over insecure networks. Computer 
Communications, 29(5), 660–6673. 
4. Chang, C.-C., Lee, C.-Y., & Chiu, Y.-C. (2009). Enhanced authentication scheme with anonymity for roaming 
service in global mobility networks. Computer Communications, 32(4), 611–618. 
5. Rhee, H. S., Kwon, J. O., & Lee, D. H. (2009). A remote user authentication scheme without using smartcards. 
Computer Standards & Interfaces, 31(1), 6–13. 
6. Juang, W.-S., & Nien, W.-K. (2008). Efficient password authenticated key agreement using bilinear pairings’. 
Mathematical and Computer Modelling, 47(2008), 1238–1245. 
7. Liu, J.-Y., Zhou, A.-M., & Gao, M.-X. (2008). A new mutual authentication scheme based on nonce and smart 
cards. Computer Communications, 31(10), 2205–2209. 
8. Wang, X. M., Zhang, W. F., Zhang, J. S., & Khan, M. K. (2007). Cryptanalysis and improvement on two 
efficient remote user authentication scheme using smart cards. Computer Stander & Interface, 29, 507–512. 
9. Wang, Y., Liu, J., Xiao, F., & Dan, J. (2009). A more efficient and secure dynamic ID-based remote user 
authentication scheme. Computer Communications, 32(4), 583–585. 
10. Chen, T.-H., Hsiang, H.-C., & Shih, W.-K. (2011). Security enhancement on an improvement on two remote 
user authenticaiton schemes using smartcards. Future Generation Computer Systems, 27(2011), 377–380. 
11. Khan,M. K., Kim, S.-K.,&Alghathbar, K. (2011).Cryptanalysis and security enhancement of a ‘more efficent 
& secure dynamic ID-based remte user authencitaion scheme’. Computer Communications, 34(2011), 305–309. 
12. Zhang, L., Tang, S., & Cai, Z. (2013). Efficient and flexible password authenticated key agreement for VoIP 
session initiation protocol using smart card. International Journal of communication systems. doi:10.1002/dac.2499. 
13. Fan, C.-I., & Lin, Y.-H. (2009). Provably secure remote truly three-factor authentication scheme with privacy 
protection on biometrics. IEEE Transations on Information Forensics and Security, 4(4), 933–945. 
14. Kocher, P., Jaffe, J., & Jun, B. (1999). Differential power analysis’. In Proceedings of advances in cryptology, 
CRYPTO’99 (pp. 388–397). 
  
15. Messerges, T. S., Dabbish, E. A., & Sloan, R. H. (2002). Examining smart card security under the threat of 
power analysis attacks. IEEE Transactions on Computers, 51(5), 541–552. 
16. Wang, R.-C., Juang,W.-S.,&Lei, C.-L. (2011).Robust authtication and key agreement scheme preserving the 
privacy of secret key. Computer Communications, 34(2011), 274–280. 
17. Li, C.-T. (2012). A new password authentication and user anonymity scheme based on elliptic 
curvecryptography and smart card. IET Inforamtion Security. doi:10.1049/ie-ifs.2012.0058. 
18. Islam, S. H., & Biswas, G. P. (2013). Design of improved password authentication and update scheme based on 
elliptic curve cryptography. Mathematical and Computer Modelling, 57(11–12), 2703–2717. 
19. Koblitz, N., Menezes, A., & Vanstone, S. (2000). The state of elliptic curve cryptography’. Designs, Codes and 
Cryptography, 19(2), 173–193. 
20. Gong, L., Needham, R., & Yahalom, R. (1990). Reasoning about belif in cryptographic protcocols. In 
Proceedings of the 1990 IEEE computer society symposium research in security and privacy (pp. 234–246). 
21. Scott, M., Costigan, N., & Abdulwahab,W. (2006). Implementing cryptographic pairings on smartcards. In 
Proceedings of the eighth workshop on cryptographic hardware and embedded systems. Yokohama, Japan (pp. 
134–147). 
22. Lee, J., & Chang, C. (2007). Secure communications for cluster-based ad hoc networks using node identities. 
Journal of Network and Computer Applications, 30(4), 1377–1396. 
23. Li, C., Hwang, M., & Chung, Y. (2008). A secure and efficient communication scheme with authenticated key 
establishment and privacy preserving for vehicular ad hoc networks. Computer Communication, 31, 2803–2814. 
 
 
